Santa’s real workshop: the town in China that makes the world’s Christmas decorations

(via The Guardian)

Inside the ‘Christmas village’ of Yiwu, there’s no snow and no elves, just 600 factories that produce 60% of all the decorations in the world …

Christmas decorations being made at a factory in Yiwu city, Zhejiang province, China - 15 Dec 2014

[…] Christened “China’s Christmas village”, Yiwu is home to 600 factories that collectively churn out over 60% of all the world’s Christmas decorations and accessories, from glowing fibre-optic trees to felt Santa hats. The “elves” that staff these factories are mainly migrant labourers, working 12 hours a day for a maximum of £200 to £300 a month – and it turns out they’re not entirely sure what Christmas is.

“Maybe it’s like [Chinese] New Year for foreigners,” says 19-year-old Wei, a worker who came to Yiwu from rural Guizhou province this year, speaking to Chinese news agency Sina. Together with his father, he works long days in the red-splattered lair, taking polystyrene snowflakes, dipping them in a bath of glue, then putting them in a powder-coating machine until they turn red – and making 5,000 of the things every day.

In the process, the two of them end up dusted from head to toe in fine crimson powder. His dad wears a Santa hat (not for the festive spirit, he says, but to stop his hair from turning red) and they both get through at least 10 face masks a day, trying not to breathe in the dust. It’s a tiring job and they probably won’t do it again next year: once they’ve earned enough money for Wei to get married, they plan on returning home to Guizhou and hopefully never seeing a vat of red powder again.

Chinese factory worker in Yiwu christmas decoration sweatshop covered in red paint

Packaged up in plastic bags, their gleaming red snowflakes hang alongside a wealth of other festive paraphernalia across town in the Yiwu International Trade Market, aka China Commodity City, a 4m sq m wonder-world of plastic tat. It is a pound shop paradise, a sprawling trade show of everything in the world that you don’t need and yet may, at some irrational moment, feel compelled to buy. There are whole streets in the labyrinthine complex devoted to artificial flowers and inflatable toys, then come umbrellas and anoraks, plastic buckets and clocks. It is a heaving multistorey monument to global consumption, as if the contents of all the world’s landfill sites had been dug-up, re-formed and meticulously catalogued back into 62,000 booths. […]

Chinese factory worker in Yiwu christmas decoration sweatshop next to shelves of manufactured junk

(Source: Wainwright, Oliver. “Santa’s real workshop: the town in China that makes the world’s Christmas decorations”. The Guardian. 19 December 2014.)

 

The Great Firewall of China and how it blocks Tor traffic

Diagram showing how GFW filters/censors tor traffic
China’s firewall is now able to dynamically recognise Tor usage and block the respective relays and bridges. The diagram above illustrates how this works: 1) the firewall searches for a bunch of bytes which identify a network connection as Tor. If these bytes are found, 2) the firewall initiates a scan of the host which is believed to be a bridge. In particular, 3) the scan is run by seemingly arbitrary Chinese computers which connect to the bridge and try to “speak Tor” to it. If this succeeds, the bridge is blocked.

(via phw’s blog on Tor Project)

Over the last years, we learned a lot about how the Great Firewall of China is blocking Tor. Some questions remained unanswered, however. Roya, Mueen, Jed, and I just published a project which seeks to answer some of these open questions. Being curious as we are, we tried to find answers to the following questions:

  • Is the filtering decentralised (i.e., happening in provinces) or centralised (i.e., happening in Internet exchange points (IXP))?
  • Are there any temporal patterns in the filtering? Or in other words, are there certain times when people are more likely to be able to connect to Tor?
  • Similarly, are there any spatial patterns? Are folks in some special regions of China able to connect to Tor while others cannot?
  • When a computer in China tries to connect to a Tor relay, what part of the TCP handshake is blocked?

It turns out that some of these questions are quite tricky to answer. For example, to find spatial patterns, we need to be able to measure the connectivity between many Tor relays and many clients in China. However, we are not able to control even a single one of these machines. So how do we proceed from here? As so often, side channels come to the rescue! In particular, we made use of two neat network measurement side channels which are the hybrid idle scan and the SYN backlog scan. The backlog scan is a new side channel we discovered and discuss in our paper. Equipped with these two powerful techniques, we were able to infer if there is packet loss between relay A and client B even though we cannot control A and B.

You might notice that our measurement techniques are quite different from most other Internet censorship studies which rely on machines inside the censoring country. While our techniques give us a lot more geographical coverage, they come at a price which is flexibility; we are limited to measuring Internet filtering on the IP layer. More sophisticated filtering techniques such as deep packet inspection remain outside our scope.

Now what we did was to measure the connectivity between several dozen Tor relays and computers in China over four weeks which means that we collected plenty of data points, each of which telling us “was A able to talk to B at time T?”. These data points reveal a number of interesting things:

  • It appears that many IP addresses inside the China Education and Research Network (CERNET) are able to connect to at least our Tor relay.
  • Apart from the CERNET netblock, the filtering seems to be quite effective despite occasional country-wide downtimes.
  • It seems like the filtering is centralised at the IXP level instead of being decentralised at the provincial level. That makes sense from the censor’s point of view because it is cheap, effective, and easy to control.

Now what does all of this mean for Tor users? Our results show that China still has a tight grip on its communication infrastructure, especially on the IP and TCP layer. That is why our circumvention efforts mostly focus on the application layer (with meek being an exception) and pluggable transport protocols such as ScrambleSuit (which is now part of the experimental version of TorBrowser) and obfs4 are specifically designed to thwart the firewall’s active probing attacks.

Check out the comments section of the original blog post at Tor Project for interesting discussion … Also, see “How The Great Firewall of China Is Blocking Tor” (PDF)

China Has 8 Million Acres of Land That Are Now Too Polluted to Grow Food On

via Earth First Journal:

For as much news as China’s smog situation makes, another large problem has lagged in attention—the pollution of 8 million acres of farmland across the country.

The land is far too polluted with heavy metals and chemicals that it can’t be used to grow food, Wang Shiyuan, deputy minister of China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection said Monday.

The Ministry found “moderate to severe pollution” on 3.3 million hectares (8.3 million acres) of land, according to Huffington Post. The country needs at least 120 million hectares of arable land to meet the large population’s needs. The nation began the year with 135 million hectares of arable land, but contamination and efforts to convert farmland to forests, grasslands and wetlands dropped that amount to 120 million hectares, ThinkProgress reported.

“These areas cannot continue farming,” Wang said.

Read full article: “China Has 8 Million Acres of Land That Are Now Too Polluted to Grow Food On